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Abstract 
The acceleration of progress in the fields of robotics, artificial 
intelligence and new digital technologies are changing the economic "dogma" 
that technological development enhances wealth and life standard of a 
country. A recent literature on the possible consequences for employment 
deriving from the widespread use of such technologies, highlights that there 
are good reasons that this time, compared to previous industrial revolutions, 
may be different (Ford, 2015). This paper analyzes the future impact that the 
progress of robotics, AI and new digital technologies will have on the 
employment, tasks and skills of workers of industrialized countries. 
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Introduction 
The fear that new technologies can destroy jobs is as old as capitalism. 
In recent decades, however, some "warnings" have raised serious doubts about 
the symbiotic relationship between productivity gains and wages, income 
inequality and the distribution of wealth, the widespread paralysis of social 
mobility, the growth of long-term unemployment, etc. 
In fact, recent progress in the field of robotics, AI and new digital 
technologies could shift the terms of comparative advantage between man 
and machine, and impact on employment, and on the replacement of some 
work by the machines, affecting both routine, non-routine, manual and 
cognitive tasks. Technological progress is driving us at great speed towards a 
new organization of the economy, society and labour market. 
 
Purpose and Objective of the Study 
The main purpose of this study was to determine the job losses with 
the advent of innovation and technological progress in this industrial 
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revolution. The research question used to guide this study was: What it will be 
the impact of robotics, AI and new digital technologies on employment and 
skills of workers in industrialized countries? 
 
Method 
The design of the research is developed with a second level analysis 
carried out through the review and systematization of the literature in the last 
five years. The research is based on quantitative analysis of the literature on 
the impact of robotics, AI and new digital technologies on the future labour 
market in industrialized countries. 
 
Robotics, AI and new digital technologies 
In addition to accelerating progress in the field of hardware 
(exponential growth of processor power) and software (increase in 
computational power), two more distinctive features have characterized the 
development of ICT: technologies became generalized and strongly 
interconnected, and cognitive ability.  
Some authors say that we are confronted with the technological 
singularity: the fundamental moment of a civilization in which technological 
progress accelerates beyond the capacity of understanding and prediction of 
human beings. Some authors defined this transformation as the fourth 
industrial revolution, which will increase the competitiveness of 
manufacturing industries, through the increasing integration of Cyber-
Physical Systems (or CPS) in industrial processes. This revolution is mainly 
based on AI, new digital technologies, and robotics. 
AI is not yet able to think and behave like a human being at the 
moment, but thanks to the "technological maturity" achieved both in the 
computational calculation, and in the ability of analysis in real-time of huge 
amounts of data and of any form, it is able to "act autonomously" by solving 
some problems, performing operations, etc. 
According to McKinsey (2017), new digital technologies will have a 
deep impact on four lines of development: the first concerns the use of data, 
computing power and connectivity, and is declined in big data, open data, 
Internet of Things, machine-to-machine and cloud computing for the 
centralization of information and its conservation. The second is that of 
analytics: once the data are collected, we need to derive its value. Today only 
1% of the data collected is used by companies, which could instead obtain 
advantages from machine learning. The third direction of development is the 
interaction between man and machine, which involves the increasingly 
widespread "touch" interfaces and augmented reality. Finally there is the 
whole sector that deals with the transition from digital to "real" and that 
includes additive manufacturing, 3D printing, robotics, communications, 
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machine-to-machine interactions and new technologies for storing and using 
energy in a targeted way, rationalizing costs and optimizing performance. 
The answer of the famous question that Turing (1950) asked himself: 
“Can machines think?” Is still the same today: “No, they cannot!” 
According to KUKA (n.d.), robotics will change the world and will have a 
disruptive influence similar to that exercised by the internet and ICT. The 
social change will be reflected in the following “four revolutions in 
automation technology” (box 1). 
Box 1 – Robotic revolution by Kuka 
Yesterday – The 1st robotic revolution 
Robot-Based Automation Solution. The age of robotics began in the 1960s and 1970s. Industrial robots brought greater efficiency and 
productivity to simple manual tasks such as lifting, spot welding and packaging. They began their triumphant advance in the automotive 
industry, spreading successively to other sectors. In this manufacturing environment, the robot operated in a fixed location within safety 
enclosures or zones to which humans had no access. Its tasks were clearly defined: relieving humans of monotonous work and assembling 
cars or other goods in large volumes as quickly and as precisely as possible. 
Today – The 2nd robotic revolution 
Sensitive and Safe Robot-Based Automation Solution. What was science fiction just a few years ago is now a reality: robots and humans 
work hand in hand. Collaborative robots like the LBR iiwa developed by KUKA enable an entirely new relationship between humans and 
robots: direct and safe collaboration – without any safety enclosure. Where there is no fence restricting freedom, the way is open for new, 
highly efficient and far more flexible applications. The robot is now a machine that can be touched and with which interaction is possible. 
It will shape daily life in various ways in the future. Whether it be as a work assistant in industry, a service robot in the public sphere, a 
nursing robot in clinical settings, a helper in the home or in many other areas, which today still sound futuristic. 
On the starting grid – The 3rd robotic revolution 
Mobile, Sensitive and Safe Robot-Based Automation Solution. As autonomous mobile units, collaborative robots are able not only to 
react intelligently to their surroundings, but also to change their place of use. The ability to interact with people, machines or workpieces in 
varying locations gives mobile robots virtually boundless application potential. Mobile robots can already perform logistics tasks 
independently, collaborate directly with humans or quickly take on new tasks at different workstations. Essentially, there are as many 
potential applications as there are ideas for such applications. 
In the future – The 4th robotic revolution 
Cognitive, Sensitive and Safe Robot-Based Automation Solution. If the robots of the future are characterized by artificial intelligence, 
they will reflect on and cognitively understand what they do. They will have the ability to interpret human language and gestures. On this 
level, robots will finally become active companions for humans. The “thinking” maid, Rosie, from the science fiction cartoon “The Jetsons” 
or Lieutenant Commander Data from “Star Trek” will indeed remain fiction for a long time, but in terms of their capabilities robots will 
come ever closer to these imagined characters. 
Source: Kuka Hello Industrie 4.0_Glossary (n.d., pp. 25-26) 
 
At the basis of the Smart Factory there are the principles of "safe 
collaboration" and "interconnectivity", favoring the increasing use of 
collaborative robots (or cobot) that thanks to learning technologies and 
access to big data, available in the cloud, can store data and replicate 
operations of human workers with which they are work hand in hand, and 
automatically reconfigure for a better definition of processes. The service 
robotics - "The Next Big Thing", destined to revolutionize our lives after the 
mobile telephony - represents one of the technological trends.  
International Federation of Robotics (2017) estimates that from 2018 
to 2020 (figure 1) global robot installations will increase by at least 15% on 
average per year (CAGR), reaching around 520.900 units in 2020. It is 
estimated that over 1.7 million new industrial robots will be installed in 
factories worldwide, between 2017 and 2020. 
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Figure 1 - Estimated worldwide annual supply of industrial robots 
 
Source: IFR World Robotics (2017) 
*Forecast 
 
Technological progress, composition of the workforce and skills 
Human capital is the factor that allows companies to use technology 
more efficiently, a disruptive element in today's society and in the new 
organization of work. The complementarities between human capital and 
technology make it possible to extricate themselves from low-skills 
(Scicchitano, 2007). About that, Scicchitano (2010) states “The model used to 
achieve this is based on some subsets of current economic literature. First, a 
short paper by Nelson & Phelps (1966) started a new trend in endogenous 
growth theories. This line of economic research studies complementarity 
between R&D and investments in human capital and does not consider the 
latter as a factor in growth accounting, since it facilitates technology adoption 
and diffusion. In particular, a crucial paper is the one devised by Acemoglu 
(1994) and developed by Redding (1996), which analyzes low-skill low-
quality traps, caused by strategic complementarity between homogeneous 
human capital (education investment) and R&D, within an imperfect labour 
market. In that model, human capital is assumed as an aggregate stock and the 
‘‘many interesting issues concerning the heterogeneity of skills are left to one 
side’’ (Redding 1996, p.458). The model here, by introducing the 
heterogeneity of human capital, through two different training systems, 
investigates the interaction between heterogeneous human capital and R&D 
and its implications for growth. In particular, this paper demonstrates that 
human capital heterogeneity can avoid low development traps when R&D is 
absent, by showing that the lack of innovations, which in Redding’s model is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the creation of low-skill low-quality 
trap, is now only necessary” (p.362). 
Based on these findings, the concept of Skill-Biased Technical 
Change (SBTC) was formulated, so investments in technological innovation 
increase the productivity of skilled labour, normally identified through a high 
level of education, compared to unqualified work, causing an increase in 
inequality in wage distribution. Autor et al. (2003) updated this hypothesis, 
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identifying the relationship between the introduction of new technologies and 
the type of tasks performed by workers, instead of the level of education. 
Technology is not neutral to skills but tends to favor some particular skills, 
while it devalues others and makes them redundant (Acemoglu & Autor, 
2011). Skills levels, however, are still too broad a category to capture current 
developments in the US and EU labour markets. 
Autor (2013) also suggest looking at individual tasks rather than skills. 
The task - unit of work process that produces output - can be performed for 
work (people) or for capital (machines or, in other words, automation). The 
division of tasks between people and machines is fluid: Autor (2013) points 
out that the new tasks are often assigned first to workers, because they are 
flexible and adaptable. These tasks are routinized and codified. New process 
technologies can make certain activities provided by workers redundant, while 
increasing the value and usefulness of others (problem solving, intuition, 
creativity, etc.) to increase productivity. 
Thus, new technologies can replace or supplement tasks performed by 
workers (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2011; Autor 2015). 
Acemoglu & Autor (2011) suggest that a distinction between manual and 
cognitive routine processes compared to non-routine jobs may be more 
appropriate, than the qualified and unqualified ones. 
This hypothesis is based on the idea that new technologies can easily 
replace workers engaged in routine tasks (manual and cognitive), while they 
are not able to replace labour intensive jobs that are not routine, where the role 
of technology is predominantly of a complementary nature. 
The demand for routine jobs and tasks has decreased considerably, 
whether these jobs or tasks are cognitive or manual. Therefore, the demand for 
people with average skills has decreased, while the demand for highly 
qualified and low skilled jobs has increased. The hypothesis that technological 
progress causes a shift in the demand for labour in favor of non-routine work 
is referred to as Routine-Biased Technical Change (RBTC). This change is 
adapted to the theoretical framework proposed by Autor et al. (2003), there is 
a prevalence of jobs with a high intensity of non-routine jobs at both the tails 
of the distribution of employment. Therefore, the polarization of workers 
towards the extremes of the distribution of qualifications is to the 
detriment of intermediate workers, more codified and affected by the 
automation processes under way. The result is a "U-shaped curve", well 
defined in the distribution of skills, consistent with the theory of work 
polarization, re-presented to international attention by Frey & Osborne (2013), 
which identify jobs with the highest content of tasks and estimate that in the 
next 20 years approximately 47% of total US employment is at risk of 
substitution (figure 2). 
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Figure 2 - Distribution of employment and probability of computerization in the USA 
 
Source: Frey & Osborne (2013, p.37) 
 
The OECD (Marcolin et al., 2016) proposed a new classification of 
routine content based on individual responses to a survey on adult skills 
(PIAAC). These results indicate that routine intensity increases with skill 
levels: jobs with lower skill requirements are also more routine intensive. In 
addition, routine medium and high intensity occupations are mainly found in 
medium-specialization jobs, due to the presence of many medium-capacity 
jobs (figure 3). About 73% of all high levels of routine intensive work, and 
68% of all medium-intensity routine interventions are classified as mid-level 
professional jobs. The group of people of medium specialization is the one 
with the highest influence on the polarization of work. 
Figure 3 - Employment by skill and routine intensity (2011-2012) 
 
Source: Marcolin et al. (2016, p.23) 
 
On average, 46% of employed people work in non-routine or low-
intensity occupations. The work also provides data on the share of different 
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routine intensity at the national level, providing an interesting perspective on 
the divergences in the European Union (figure 4). 
Figure 4 - Employment by routine intensity in various OECD countries (2011-2012) 
 
Source: Marcolin et al. (2016, p.21) 
 
Italy and Spain show most of the employees having a high-intensity 
routine, while Austria, Germany and Denmark have the lowest percentage in 
this category. If we summarize the employment rates of medium and high-
intensity routine, the United Kingdom and Ireland have the highest degree of 
routine intensity in the EU, followed by Slovakia and Poland.  
In a recent paper on impact of industry 4.0 on occupations and 
employment in Turkey, Sümer (2018) states that there will be considerable 
losses in some occupational categories with routine tasks, both in manual and 
cognitive jobs. 
 
The effects of technologies on employment 
The concept of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942) states that 
technology can destroy jobs, businesses and/or entire sectors, but at the same 
time can create jobs, businesses and sectors. According to Ford (2015) the fear 
is that "the economy is going down a road that will lead it to a turning point, 
apart from which job creation will regularly start to fall short of what is 
required to achieve full employment" (p.186). 
Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2014) highlighted that labour, as we know it, 
is destined to disappear in the coming years. 
Ford (2009) says that in the future, the machines will be able to perform 
the tasks of a large part of the average population and, therefore, for these 
people there will no longer be new jobs (misalignment between increased 
productivity and job growth). In the next book, Ford (2015) reinforcing this 
concept, highlights that the acceleration of technical progress is causing a 
much faster change than other periods of history. In the past, workers who 
carried out routine work and/or workers with low level of education and 
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training were affected, today also those who carry-out cognitive jobs, such us 
professionals with well-defined skills whose jobs could have tasks that can be 
absorbed by automation processes and the greater power of the algorithms can 
be affected. In fact, if a job - or part of it - has routine tasks or has the predictive 
character, this means that a person or an algorithm might be able to perform 
that task simply by studying a detailed report of the activity done in the past, 
or repeating tasks already performed. Now the work moves to digital – 
understandable and measurable for machines – and machines can learn the 
work, and even execute it. The risk is enormous; many people could even start 
carrying out some studies, which once concluded, would not guarantee them 
work (or less than guaranteed today). Productivity is growing thanks to new 
technologies, but it is not followed by the increase in jobs, since it is supported 
by increasingly pervasive machines and technological tools. 
The literature on the impact of technological progress on employment 
levels does not have results comparable to the extensive literature on effects 
on employment rates and/or wage distribution. The results of these works are 
fragmented and unambiguous, so as not to reach a consensus on the topic. 
Therefore, the literature presented below (table 2) does not expect to be 
exhaustive, but also offers an overview of how these studies are evolving. 
Table 2 - Empirical studies at the level of economics and country 
Source 
Geographical 
dimension, 
sector, period 
Results 
Frey & Osborn, 
2013 
USA,  
All sectors 
10-20 years 
About 47% of total employment in the United States is at risk of being replaced by automation 
in the next 20 years. 
Bruegel blog & 
Bowles, 2014 
UE-28 
10-20 years 
In the next decades, EU countries will lose between 47% (Sweden) and over 60% (Romania) 
of the workforce because of advances in technology (This study has replicated the Frey and 
Osborne work). 
Bonin et al., 
2015 
Germany, 
All sectors 
Germany will lose about 12% of the workforce. 
Wolter et al., 
2015 
 
Germany 
Manufacturing,  
(Up to 2030) 
About 60,000 workers will lose their jobs in manufacturing sector until 2030 (This is the result 
of the difference between who lose their jobs (420,000) and who acquire it (360,000), thanks to 
robotics, AI and new technologies). 
 OECD 
(Arntz et al., 
2016) 
 
21 OECD  
Countries 
On average, 9% of the work in the 21 OECD countries analyzed is automatable. The share 
of workers with the highest probability of being replaced by automation is higher in Germany 
and Austria (12% of the labour force) and lower in Estonia, Finland, Belgium and Korea (6-
7%). 
Citibank 
(Frey, Osborne, 
& Holmes, 2016) 
Over 50 
Countries and 
Regions 
The average of the places subject to automation rises to 57%, with peaks of 69% in India 
and 77% in China. 
World Economic 
Forum, 2016 
 
15 major 
developed and 
emerging 
economies 
The effect will be the creation of two million new jobs, compared to seven that will disappear, 
with a net negative balance of over five million jobs. Italy comes out with a draw (200,000 created 
and as many lost places), better than other countries like France and Germany. At professional 
group level, losses will be concentrated in administrative areas (4.8 million destroyed) and 
production (1.6 million). According to the research, the financial, management, IT and engineering 
sectors will partially offset these losses. 
ILO 
(Chang & 
Huynh, 2016) 
ASEAN-5 
20 years 
56% of employment is at high risk of automation (32% at medium risk, and 12% at low 
risk). 
World Bank, 
2016 
In the coming 
decades 
2/3 of all jobs could be susceptible to automation in developing countries. 
PWC, 2017 
Major developed 
economies 
2030 
The study estimates that the UK (30%) has a lower proportion of existing jobs at potential 
high risk of automation than the US (38%) and Germany (35%), but more than Japan 
(21%). 
McKinsey 
Global Institute, 
2017 
46 countries 
(represent about 
80% of the 
global 
workforce) 
Less than 5% of occupations can be fully automated; about 60% of them can have 30% of 
the automated activities. These percentages affect about 1.2 billion workers and $ 14.6 trillion 
wages. China, India, Japan, and the United States make up more than half of these workers and 
wages. The drive for automation of global productivity could be 0.8-1.4% each year in the coming 
decades. 
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Estimates vary between the creation and destruction of jobs by about 
half of the workforce, depending on the method and assumptions used. The 
differences in the method employed are more evident between Frey & Osborne 
(2013, 2017) and Bowles (2014) on the one hand, and Bonin et al. (2015) and 
Arntz et al. (2016) on the other. This last study, in turn, is in contrast with the 
estimates of World Bank (2016). For this, it is not possible to compare the data 
of these empirical studies. 
These studies also seek to divide occupations into various tasks, and 
analyze the substitution at the task-level. 
Doing a specific analysis of data on empirical studies in the table 2 
about developed and developing countries, the study of McKinsey Global 
Institute (2017) shows that in 46 Countries (represent about 80% of the global 
workforce) less than 5% of occupations can be fully automated; about 60% of 
them can have 30% of the automated activities.  
About developed countries, on average, 9% of the work in the 21 
OECD countries analyzed is automatable. The share of workers with the 
highest probability of being replaced by automation is higher in Germany and 
Austria (12% of the labour force) and lower (6-7%) in Estonia, Finland, 
Belgium and Korea (Arntz et al., 2016). In USA about 47% of total 
employment of all sectors is at risk of being replaced by automation (Frey & 
Osborn, 2013); 38% of jobs for PWC (2017). EU countries are expected to 
lose between 47% (Sweden) and over 60% (Romania) of the workforce 
because of advances in technology (Bruegel blog and Bowles, 2014). In 
addition, PWC study estimates that the UK has a 30% of existing jobs at 
potential high risk of automation. Germany is a controversial case: in the 
PWC study (2017) 35% of jobs is at potential risk of automation; 12% of jobs 
for OECD (2016) and for Bonin et al. (2015). In Asia, PWC (2017) estimates 
that 21% of existing jobs in Japan is at potential high risk of automation. The 
jobs at risk due to technology disruption are 77% in China and 69% in India 
(Frey, Osborne, & Holmes, 2016). 
With a view to proposing a specific analysis of developing countries, 
please find the chart of estimation of data below (figure 5) of World Bank 
report (2016). Two-thirds of all jobs in the world could be susceptible to 
automation in developing countries in the coming decades; even if large-scale 
net job destruction due to automation should not be a concern for most 
developing countries in the short term, due to barriers to technology adoption, 
lower wages, and a higher prevalence of jobs based on manual dexterity 
(World Bank, 2016). 
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Figure 5 - Estimation on the share of employment susceptible to automation in developing 
countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2016, p.23) 
 
The comparison shows that new technologies can destroy the demand 
for certain tasks, but this does not mean that full employment is extinguished 
or that the entire employment becomes redundant. Instead, a common 
weakness of all these studies is that they only estimate the losses resulting 
from new technologies based on current employment structures, not on what 
new technologies are creating or could create. All studies confirm the positive 
effect of product innovations on employment levels, while in terms of 
innovation in production processes, ambiguous and contradictory emerge: 
depending on the case, when the estimates are significant, they range from 
positive to negative. Therefore, the literature does not seem to support the 
thesis in favor of the hypothesis of prevalence of the substitution effect. 
 
Conclusion 
For decades, the literature has always analysed the impacts of 
technological progress on the economy, society, and specifically on the labour 
market; but some scholars, in the last five years, say that, compared to past 
industrial revolutions, this time it might be different.  
This literature has had a great impact, above all on politicians and 
public opinion, than the literature that reports data of an increase in jobs to the 
advent of technological progress (the last report of the World Economic 
Forum "The future of job 2018", which reverses the catastrophic forecasts 
emphasizing that over the next five years, AI and advanced robotics will create 
133 million jobs, compared to the 75 million destroyed). 
In any case, the conclusions are the following. 
a. Although technological progress has accelerated, some authors state that it 
remains a slow process due to economic, social and regulatory obstacles; 
so the man-machine substitution won't happen in the times and in the 
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hypothesized ways. Moreover, many occupations are composed of 
automated and not automated tasks, and this certainly constitutes an 
"insurance" for the "complete" replacement of that worker. 
b. The above advances are so swift and unstoppable, that people, 
organizations, workers and their skills, and politics themselves struggle to 
keep up with these advances. This "second era of machines" requires an 
improvement in the pace and quality of innovation of structures, 
organizational processes and business models, and in human capital. 
c. Specifically, the investment in human capital is the driver necessary to 
face such technical progress. New skills are needed, in particular soft skills. 
This requires an afterthought of the entire educational and training 
system, as well as a re-literacy of adults, "pressed" by the gap that will be 
created between speed of change and speed of learning, to make them more 
"compatible" with this technological progress. Even more important will 
be the role of national, regionals, schools and universities placement 
offices, as well as all other tools for dialogue with the territories and their 
economies. 
d. Even in presence of growth at a general level, a significant number of 
people will see their own standard of living diminished or even threatened. 
In this situation, the hypothesis of a redistribution of income, regardless 
of the form used (example basic income), it can on the one hand favor re-
skilling or forms of neo-entrepreneurship, on the other hand, there is a risk 
that the unemployed will not re-enter the labour market. In this case, the 
costs of switching between old and new jobs will be paid by the most fragile 
workers, given that the legislation and many of the tools currently in use 
are not adequate to deal with this change. 
e. The idea of the labour market, and the concept of work, will no longer 
be what we mean today. The forms of protection of "traditional" work will 
be modified or totally changed. The types of contracts will change, and 
flexible forms will be replaced by permanent work with increasing 
frequency, also questioning social security policies and traditional 
protective techniques, as well as schedules, times and methods of work. 
People's negotiation skills will be tested by the continuous changes in 
working relationships and employers, with the relative risk of not being 
able to move at the pace that the market will impose on them, remaining 
crushed from the income and psychosocial point of view. The company 
organization itself will undergo significant changes, which will require a 
new model of labour market based on the good functioning of the service 
network at work, with a strong governance. 
 
In conclusion, politics and economics must find new solutions and new 
ways of governing to govern these new processes, mitigating their negative 
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social consequences consortia and ensuring that there is equitable participation 
in the fruits of progress. 
 
References: 
1. Acemoglu, D. (1994). Search in the labour market, incomplete 
contracts and growth. CEPR, Discussion Paper, 1026. London: Centre 
for Economic Policy Research. 
2. Acemoglu, D., & Autor, D.H. (2011). Skills, tasks and technologies: 
Implications for employment and earnings. Handbook of Labor 
Economics, 4, 1043-1171. doi:10.1016/S0169-7218(11)02410-5. 
3. Arntz, M., Terry, G., & Zierahn, U. (2016). The risk of automation for 
jobs in OECD countries: A comparative analysis. OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Papers, 189. Retrieved from OECD 
website: 
http://www.ifuturo.org/sites/default/files/docs/automation.pdf . 
4. Autor, D.H., Levy, F., & Murnane, R.J. (2003, November). The skill 
content of recent technological change: an empirical exploration. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 4, 1279–1333. 
doi:10.1162/003355303322552801. 
5. Autor, D.H. (2013, January). The ‘task approach’ to labour markets: 
an overview. Journal for Labour Market Research, 46, 3, 185-199. 
doi:10.1007/s12651-013-0128-z. 
6. Autor, D.H. (2015, Summer). Why are there still so many jobs? The 
history and future of workplace automation. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 29, 3, 3-30. doi:10.1257/jep.29.3.3. 
7. Bonin, H., Gregory T., & Zierahn U. (2015, April). Übertragung der 
Studie von Frey/Osborne (2013) a uf Deutschland. Kurzexpertise im 
Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales. 
[Transmission of the study by Frey/Osborne (2013) on Germany. Short 
expertise on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social]. 
ZEW. 
8. Bowles, J. (2014, July). The computerisation of European jobs. 
Brussels: Breughel. Retrieved from http://bruegel.org/2014/07/the-
computerisation-of-european-jobs/. 
9. Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2011). Race against the machine: 
How the digital revolution is accelerating innovation, driving 
productivity, and irreversibly transforming employment and the 
economy. Lexington, Massachusetts: Digital Frontier Press. 
10. Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The second machine age: 
Work progress, and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies. New 
York: W. Norton and Company.  
European Scientific Journal December 2018 edition Vol.14, No.36 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
80 
11. Ford, M.R. (2009). The lights in the tunnel: Automation, accelerating 
technology and the economy of the future. USA: Acculant publishing. 
12. Ford, M.R. (2015). The rise of the robots: technology and the threat of 
mass unemployment. London: One World Publications. 
13. Frey, C.B., & Osborne, M.A. (2013). The future of employment: How 
susceptible are jobs to computerization?. Oxford: Oxford University. 
14. Frey, C.B., & Osborne, M.A., Holmes, C. (2016, January). Technology 
at work v2.0. The future is not what it used to be. Citibank. 
15. IFR. (2017). World Robotics 2017 Industrial Robots. Frankfurt am 
Main: International Federation of Robotics. 
16. Kuka, (n.d.). Hello industrie 4.0_glossary. KUKA Aktiengesellschaft. 
17. Marcolin, L., Miroudot S., & Squicciarini M. (2016), The routine 
content of occupations: new cross-country measures based on PIAAC. 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. doi:10.1787/5jm0q1dhszjg-en. 
18. McKinsey. (2017). A future that works: automation, employment and 
productivity. McKinsey Global Institute. 
19. OECD. (2016). Automation and independent work in a digital 
economy, Policy Brief on the Future of Work. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
20. Redding, S. (1996). The low-skill, low-quality trap: Strategic 
complementarities between human capital and R&D. Economic 
Journal, 106, 435, 458-470. Retrieved from 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2235260?seq=1#page_scan_tab_content
s. 
21. Schumpeter, J.A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New 
York, London: Harper & Brothers. 
22. Scicchitano, S. (2007). On the complementarity between on-the-job 
training and Ra brief overview. Economics Bulletin, 15, 2, 1-11. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume15/EB-
07O00002A.pdf. 
23. Scicchitano, S. (2010). Complementarity between heterogeneous 
human capital and R&D: can job-training avoid low development 
traps?. Empirica, 37, 4, 361–380. Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10663-009-9113-8. 
24. Sümer, B. (2018). Impact of industry 4.0 on occupations and 
employment in Turkey. ESJ, 14. doi 
http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2018.v14n10p1 . 
25. WEF (2016). The future of jobs. Employment, skills and workforce 
strategy for the fourth industrial revolution. World Economic Forum. 
European Scientific Journal December 2018 edition Vol.14, No.36 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
81 
26. Wolter, M.I., Mönnig, A., Hummel M., Schneemann C., Weber, E., 
Helmrich R., Maier T., & Neuber-Pohl, C. (2015). Industrie 4.0 und 
die Folgen für Arbeitsmarkt und Wirtschaft. Nürnberg: IAB- 
Forschungsbericht. 
27. World Bank. (2016). World Development Report 2016: Digital 
Dividends. Washington DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-
0728-2. 
 
  
